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I , after a reign of forty years, King Gezo of Dahomey died and was
succeeded by one of his sons called Badahun, who took the royal name of
Glele by which he is more generally known. Badahun had been Gezo’s
designated heir apparent for at least nine years prior to this but his accession
to the throne was nevertheless challenged. The name Glele which he adopted
alludes to these challenges, being according to Dahomian tradition ab-
breviated from the aphorism Glelile ma nh oh n ze, ‘You cannot take away a farm
[gle] ’, meaning that he would not allow anyone to appropriate the fruits of his
labours, which is explained as expressing ‘his contempt for the attacks to
which he had been exposed as heir apparent’."
The fact that the succession to the throne was disputed on this occasion
was, in itself, nothing unusual. Almost all royal successions in Dahomian
history were contested among rival princes claiming the throne. Although
the succession passed in principle to the king’s eldest son, this rule of
primogeniture was qualified in two ways. First, the king might choose to set
aside the claims of his eldest son if he was considered in any way unfit for the
throne and designate as heir apparent another of his sons instead – as,
indeed, had occurred in the case of Badahun himself. Moreover, the
designated heir did not succeed automatically since the king’s choice could
be set aside in favour of another prince by the Migan and the Mehu, the two
highest-ranking chiefs of the kingdom. Consequently, even when an heir
apparent had been formally designated, the succession regularly became a
matter of factional intrigue, often even before the reigning king’s death. An
eighteeenth-century account thus noted that the king’s senior wives cus-
tomarily ‘ intrigue to have their sons adopted’ as the heir ;# and a con-
temporary account of the last years of Gezo, alluding to Badahun’s status as
heir presumptive, describes how ‘each prince seeks to form a party and a
little court for himself ’.$
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It appears, however, that in  more was involved than the competing
claims of individual princes. Although there is no clear recollection of this in
Dahomian tradition, contemporary evidence shows that the challenge to
Glele’s accession in  reflected a wider background of dissension within
the Dahomian ruling e! lite. Gezo during the last years of his reign had faced
growing opposition from among his chiefs, with which Badahun, as heir
apparent, was associated. These divisions arose immediately over the issue of
human sacrifice, which Gezo was seeking to curtail, but this in turn reflected
more general disagreements over Dahomey’s response to the problems posed
by the decline of the Atlantic slave trade. The episode thus bears upon the
influential (but contested) argument of Tony Hopkins, that the transition
from slaves to alternative ‘ legitimate’ forms of trade posed a ‘crisis of
adaptation’ for the rulers of West African states.%
The interpretation of these political divisions offered here is not new,
having been briefly adumbrated in earlier publications of the author.& The
question of internal divisions within Dahomey over the slave trade and
human sacrifice, and of their connection with the disputed royal succession
of , has also been treated from different perspectives by David Ross
(), Susan Hargreaves () and John Reid ().' All three studies,
however, have regrettably remained unpublished and their influence on
perceptions of Dahomian history has therefore been limited. Conversely, the
factional divisions within Dahomey in the s are not mentioned at all in
some published work, either on the reign of Gezo in general or on his
commercial policy in particular.( Even the sole published account which
deals in detail with factional divisions within the Dahomian ruling e! lite
during Gezo’s later years, by John Yoder (), fails to link these to the
disputed royal succession of .) In view of this general neglect, it seemed
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worthwhile to pull together the available relevant material to present this
more detailed account and analysis.
The context of the factional disputes of the s was, as already indicated,
the ending of the Atlantic slave trade.* For Dahomey, this process had two
aspects : first, the decline of trans-Atlantic demand for slaves, which became
critical with the effective cessation of slave imports into Brazil after  ;
and second, the more direct pressure of the British government for
Dahomian co-operation in ending the slave trade, which culminated at the
end of  in a naval blockade of Dahomey."! Although the decline of the
slave trade coincided with the expansion of an alternative trade in palm oil,
this transition posed considerable difficulties for the Dahomian state. In part,
the problem was that the state was not able to maintain the degree of control,
and therefore the level of revenue, in the new trade which it had enjoyed in
the old."" But even more critically, partly in consequence of its long history
of participation in the slave trade – the principal source of slaves for which
was capture in warfare – Dahomey was a warrior state, with a deep-seated
military ethos which involved a disdain for agriculture."# As Gezo protested
to a British mission demanding the ending of the slave trade in  :
they were a military people, the Dahomians, and of course unaccustomed to
agricultural pursuits…He asked if we had seen any farms between the swamp [i.e.
the marshes of the Lama which separated the Dahomian heartland around the
capital Abomey from the coastal provinces to the south] and Abomey? He could
not disgrace himself and subject himself to be laughed at by sending the women
from his palace yard to plant and cultivate cotton…
Or even more melodramatically, according to an alternative account of the
same conversation ‘I cannot send my women to cultivate the soil, it would kill
them’."$ Re-orienting Dahomey’s overseas commerce from slaves to agri-
cultural produce therefore implied the undermining of this traditional
militarism.
These cultural obstacles were compounded by the fact that the economic
issue of the slave trade was bound up with the religious issue of human
sacrifice. Human sacrifice in Dahomey was practised mainly at the ‘Annual
Customs’, the principal public ceremony of the monarchy, at which victims
were offered to the deceased kings of the Dahomian dynasty. Those killed
on these occasions were principally captives taken in Dahomey’s wars, whose
sacrifice served to celebrate Dahomian military prowess. Human sacrifice
and the export slave trade were thus closely inter-connected, both being
* For the general background, cf. C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and its
Rulers (Oxford, ), chs. – ; Patrick Manning, Slavery, Colonialism and Economic
Growth in Dahomey, – (Cambridge, ), –.
"! For a fuller account, see Robin Law, ‘An African response to Abolition: Anglo-
Dahomian negotiations on ending the slave trade, – ’, Slavery and Abolition, 
(), –.
"" See further Robin Law, ‘Royal monopoly and private enterprise in the Atlantic
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linked to Dahomian militarism, the former constituting part of its ideological
superstructure and the latter an important aspect of its material foundation.
If ending Dahomey’s involvement in the slave trade would necessarily imply
undermining Dahomian militarism, any attempt at the latter would in turn
necessarily put in question the institution of human sacrifice.
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The response of Dahomey’s ruling e! lite to British demands for the end of the
slave trade and human sacrifice has also to be related to the internal history
of Dahomey itself earlier in the nineteenth century. Gezo had come to the
throne irregularly in  by forcibly deposing his elder brother,
Adandozan."% Although the deposition of Adandozan is generally portrayed
in Dahomian tradition as representing a unanimous response of the people,
chiefs and royal family to his tyrannies, contemporary evidence suggests that
Gezo’s position in the early years of his reign was in fact very precarious. An
account of  reports that Gezo had lately become ‘unpopular’, in
consequence of recent military defeats by the Mahis to the north-east, and
for having resorted (presumably as a result of this lack of military success) to
‘selling great numbers of his own people, and destroying his own towns and
villages for the purpose of procuring slaves’, in contradiction to the usual
convention prohibiting the sale as slaves of native Dahomians. Gezo’s
position was so weakened that he had even offered to reinstate Adandozan on
the throne. But the latter refused, hoping that popular pressure would
eventually force his restoration against Gezo’s will rather than by his
favour."&
Although in the longer run Gezo’s position was consolidated by a series of
brilliant military successes (including the eventual conquest of the Mahis),
the difficulties he faced at the beginning of his reign are reflected in
significant modifications in Dahomian political institutions. In general
terms, it must be supposed that the circumstances of Gezo’s accession made
him more dependent than earlier monarchs on the goodwill of his chiefs, and
especially of the two highest-ranking of these, the Migan and the Mehu. The
British naval officer Frederick Forbes, for example, who served in the British
mission of , noted that the king could not act without the ‘concurrence’
of the Migan and the Mehu, who had, ‘ if united, more power’ than he."'
Likewise, Gezo was obliged to make concessions to other royal princes in
order to restore the unity of the royal lineage and secure its loyalty to himself.
In the eighteenth century as a matter of deliberate policy, royal princes other
than the designated heir apparent had been systematically excluded from
positions of power and rank, but Gezo broke with this precedent. The classic
recension of Dahomian traditional history recorded by the French official Le
Herisse! in the s states that he introduced the practice of appointing
"% Mousa Oumar Sy, ‘Le Dahomey: le coup d’e! tat de  ’, Folia Orientalia, 
(), –.
"& Public Record Office, London [hereafter PRO]: ADM.}, Hugh Clapperton,
‘Remarks on Little Popo and Whydah’, Nov. . My profound thanks to J. R. Bruce
Lockhart, who is currently working on a biography of Clapperton, for drawing this
hitherto neglected source to my attention.
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relatives as aides or counterparts to the principal chiefs of the kingdom,
though it is stressed that these posts were ‘purely honorary’, carrying no real
power."( More recent testimony recalls more specifically that he appointed
two of his own brothers, Ganse and Tometin, respectively as Migan and
Mehu (i.e. evidently as counterparts or deputies to these chiefs) in reward for
their assistance in overthrowing Adandozan.") The contemporary account of
Forbes, attending the Dahomian Annual Customs in , mentions both
Ganse and Tometin among the officers in attendance at the royal court,
though they are not recorded to have played any active role in the discussions
of policy which Forbes witnessed."* Ganse outlived Gezo, dying in .#!
The British Consul (and pioneer anthropologist) Richard Burton, visiting
Dahomey on another abortive anti-slave trade mission under Gezo’s suc-
cessor Glele in , also saw a Ganse and a Tometin taking part in a
ceremonial procession, but these were younger men who had inherited the
status and names of Gezo’s brothers.#" Much more prominent than Ganse or
Tometin in Forbes’ account of the Customs of  were two other brothers
of Gezo called Linkpehun and Ahokpe, who did frequently intervene in the
policy debates.## One legacy of the circumstances of Gezo’s accession,
therefore, was the more active involvement of members of the royal family
in the politics of the Dahomian court.
Other significant institutional changes deriving directly from the events of
 related to the organization of the Atlantic slave trade. Gezo’s coup d’eU tat
against Adandozan had been financed by a Brazilian slavetrader, Francisco
Felix de Souza, who in recompense was installed by Gezo as his principal
trading agent (with the title Chacha) at the Dahomian port of Whydah, a post
which he held until his death in .#$ Slavetrading interests were thus
being consolidated in a position of greater social prestige and political
influence in Dahomey at the very time when Britain was beginning its
campaign to bring the slave trade to an end, thereby significantly restricting
Gezo’s room for manoeuvre in response to British demands. In , for
example, Gezo claimed that it was difficult for him to take action against the
slave trade at Whydah because ‘he was under obligations to a certain large
slave-merchant in that settlement’.#%
Even more critical in their long-term effects on Dahomian politics,
"( Le Herisse! , L’ancien royaume du Dahomey, .
") Maurice Ahanhanzo Gle! le! , Le Danxome (Paris, ), , .
"* ‘Gan-seh’ and ‘Toh-mah-tee’ are listed among those receiving the royal bounty:
Forbes, Dahomey, ii, . Cf. also ii, , referring to ‘Toh-mah-tee (king’s brother) ’.
#! Richard Burton, A Mission to Gelele, King of Dahome ( vols.) (London, ), ii,
–. #" Ibid. ii, , n.
## Forbes, Dahomey, ii, , , ,  (‘Leh-peh-hoong’) ; , , , , ,
 (‘Ah-hoh-peh’) ; and cf. Burton, Mission to Gelele, ii, , n., who gives these names
in the forms ‘Enekpehun’ and ‘Ahopwe’. For traditional recollection of a brother of Gezo
called Linkpehun, see Paul Hazoume! , Le pacte de sang au Dahomey (Paris, ), .
Ahokpe was the son of King Agonglo (–) by Sophie, an Afro-European woman
formerly married to Ollivier de Montague' re, Director of the French fort at Whydah in
– : Reynier, ‘Ouidah: organisation du commandement’ (), in MeUmoire du
BeUnin,  (), .
#$ David Ross, ‘The first Chacha of Whydah: Francisco Felix de Souza’, Odu, rd Ser.
 (), –.
#% John Duncan, Travels in Western Africa ( vols.) (London, ), ii, .
  
however, were the reasons adduced in justification for the overthrow of
Adandozan. The earliest recorded accounts of the circumstances of
Adandozan’s deposition cite only his alleged cruelty: a report of , for
example, asserts that his ‘cruelty was so great that it was considered a
disgrace to the state’ ; and that of , already cited, that he ‘had become
addicted to drunkenness, and when in that state indulged in the most wanton
cruelties’.#& Forbes in , however, was told that Adandozan was deposed
because of his ‘unmilitary character’, as being ‘unfit to reign over a brave
warlike nation such as Dahomey’.#' More recently recorded versions of
Dahomian tradition further invoke the issue of human sacrifice. The classic
account of Le Herisse! claims that Adandozan ‘affected to neglect the cult of
the dead and no longer pour water [i.e. human blood] on their tombs’; and
a subsequent account even that ‘he refused, for twenty years [i.e. throughout
his reign, –] to make sacrifices to the memory of his father
Agonglo’.#( The suggestion that Adandozan was opposed to human sacrifice
in principle, however, seems implausible; it is contradicted by the evidence
of a letter which he sent to the King of Portugal in , which openly refers
to his having offered human sacrifices to his father.#) Although it is
conceivable that Adandozan changed his mind on this issue after , it
seems more probable that the original complaint against him was merely that
his lack of military success was yielding insufficient supplies of captives to
maintain the sacrifices at their customary level.
Ade Akinjogbin, although not mentioning the issue of human sacrifice,
has suggested that Adandozan did pursue a conscious policy of demili-
tarization, intending to abandon the slave trade and replace it with exports
of agricultural produce.#* The only evidence cited in support of this view,
however, is a record that in  Adandozan celebrated a ceremony called
the ‘small corn [i.e. millet, as opposed to maize] custom’.$! As Ross pointed
out, there is nothing in the original report which implies even that this
ceremony was an innovation, far less that it was part of wider project of
promoting agriculture as an alternative to the slave trade.$" (Nor, it may be
suggested, would the celebration specifically of millet cultivation have been
at all relevant to the export trade.) It may also be noted that Dahomian
tradition (in a different context) attributes to Adandozan an emphatic
reassertion of Dahomey’s traditional militaristic values: ‘Our fathers…
cultivated not with hoes but with guns. The kings of Dahomey cultivate only
war’.$# If the slave trade declined under Adandozan, this too was more likely
#& Royal Gold Coast Gazette,  Feb.  ; PRO: ADM.}, Clapperton, ‘Remarks
on Little Popo and Whydah’, Nov. . #' Forbes, Dahomey, i,  ; ii, .
#( Le Herisse! , L’ancien royaume du Dahomey,  ; Gle! le! , Le Danxome, .
#) King of Dahomey,  Nov. , quoted in Pierre Verger, Flux et reflux de la Traite
des Ne[ gres entre le Golfe de BeUnin et Bahia to Todos os Santos, du XVe au XIXe sie[ cles
(Paris, ), , n. .
#* I. A. Akinjogbin, Dahomey and its Neighbours – (Cambridge, ), .
$! PRO: T.}, Day Book, William’s Fort, Whydah,  Oct. .
$" David Ross, ‘The anti-slave trade theme in Dahoman history: an examination of the
evidence’, History in Africa,  (), .
$# Le Herisse! , L’ancien royaume de Dahomey,  (Adandozan’s reply to an embassy
from Oyo, demanding tribute, which suggested that he should cultivate the soil to earn
the wealth needed to pay it).
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due to his lack of military success than to deliberate policy. What is not in
doubt, however, is that Gezo sought to legitimize his usurpation by stressing
his own status – in contrast to Adandozan – as a successful warrior king, and
that the series of military campaigns which he consequently launched yielded
increased supplies of captives, which fuelled a revival of both the slave trade
and of human sacrifice. This, even more than his alliance with the Chacha de
Souza, had the effect of committing him firmly to the maintenance of these
policies in direct contradiction to the demands of the British.
Recollections of Adandozan’s deposition and the reassertion of Dahomian
militaristic values which it involved dominated Dahomian politics during
Gezo’s reign, and indeed in the reign of his successor Glele. In resisting
British pressure for the abolition of the slave trade and human sacrifice, both
kings repeatedly cited the danger of revolution. In , for example, when
a visiting British trader expressed disapproval of human sacrifice, Gezo
replied: ‘I am king over this people whose customs I must observe, if I were
not to give them these victims they would rebel and sacrifice me’.$$ Likewise
in  Gezo asserted that he could not give up the slave trade:
The form of his government could not be suddenly changed, without causing such
a revolution as would deprive him of his throne, and precipitate his kingdom into
a state of anarchy…He held his power by an observance of the time-honoured
customs of his forefathers; and he would forfeit it, and entail upon himself a life
full of shame, and a death full of misery, if he rejected them.$%
Similar statements were made subsequently by Glele, on the issue of human
sacrifice. In , for example: ‘ if I do not carry out the Custom as usual I
am afraid that I shall be dethroned or hurt by the subjects ’.$& In  : ‘If I
were to give up this custom at once, my head would be taken off to-
morrow’.$' And again in  : ‘ if he attempted to stop the Custom his
people would rise up against him and dethrone him; and then where would
be the gain?’$(
 ’  , –
Given the political constraints arising from the circumstances of his ac-
cession, whatever his personal inclinations Gezo was clearly in no position to
accede to British demands for the immediate suppression of the slave trade.
He did not, however, reject the British overtures outright, but attempted to
maintain friendly relations by encouraging the growth of the new trade in
palm oil and holding out the prospect that it might replace the slave trade in
the longer term by gradual transition. But this policy of compromise was
feasible only as long as the British were willing to be patient, and it broke
down decisively with the naval blockade of –, under pressure of which
Gezo was obliged to accept a treaty banning the export of slaves from
Dahomey, in January .
$$ PP: Report of the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa,  [hereafter
RSCWCA], Minutes of Evidence, W. M. Hutton, .
$% PP: Missions to the King of Ashantee and Dahomey (), Report of B.
Cruickshank,  Nov. , .
$& Bernasko,  Oct. , quoted in Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, .
$' PP: Despatches from Commodore Wilmot, respecting his Visit to the King of
Dahomey (), . $( J. A. Skertchly, Dahomey As It Is (London, ), –.
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While the content and style of Gezo’s diplomacy in dealing with the
British down to  are clear enough, there is some disagreement over
whether his policy represented the united view of the Dahomian ruling e! lite
in this period or reflected factional divisions within it. Ross argued that Gezo
faced significant opposition among his chiefs throughout his reign and had
indeed been able to maintain his position initially only through his alliance
with the Chacha Francisco Felix de Souza. When de Souza’s commercial
fortunes declined in the s, therefore, Gezo sought alliance with the
British as an alternative source of support, culminating in his acceptance of
the anti-slave trade treaty of .$) This analysis, however, is unpersuasive.
Although Gezo, as has been seen, did recurrently stress the danger of a
revolution against him, this is best understood as referring to a hypothetical
possibility rather than to actually existing opposition, and was cited by Gezo
as a reason for resisting rather than acceding to British demands. Certainly,
Gezo eventually accepted the banning of the slave trade in  under duress
rather than as part of a pro-British policy. Nor is there any evidence of
disagreement with this action on the part of Gezo’s chiefs, such as the Migan
and the Mehu, both of whom also ‘signed’ the  treaty.$*
Yoder also posited political divisions between Gezo and some of his chiefs
over the issue of British demands for the end of the slave trade in this period,
although unlike Ross he placed Gezo in the anti-British rather than the pro-
British faction.%! Yoder based his argument on an analysis of debates at the
Annual Customs of , recorded by Forbes, which in fact concerned the
question of against whom the next Dahomian campaign should be directed:
Abeokuta to the east or Aja to the west. Since an attack on Abeokuta implied
direct defiance of Britain, which was seeking to protect Abeokuta, Yoder
argued that this issue symbolized a more general debate over whether to
accommodate British demands and hence, by implication, over whether to
accept the abolition of the slave trade.
Yoder dubbed the opposing factions whose existence he inferred the ‘Fly’
and ‘Elephant’ parties, on the supposition that these terms were employed
in the debates of  to allude to the two alternative proposed objectives for
the next campaign, respectively Aja and Abeokuta. Forbes quotes a military
officer as declaring: ‘If we go to war, we cannot come back empty-handed;
if we fail to catch elephants, let us be content with flies’.%" There seems no
doubt that this represents a genuine Dahomian idiom, more or less
accurately reported by Forbes, since very similar language (albeit with the
substitution of ants for flies) occurs in a twentieth-century account of
Dahomian court ceremonial : ‘The King has said that Dahomey is the enemy
of all the world, and that his chiefs must use as much force in killing an ant
as they would to kill an elephant, for the small things bring on the large
ones’.%# Ross questioned whether, at the Customs of , this metaphor
should be understood as alluding to the choice between Aja and Abeokuta,
but since this question was central to the debates reported by Forbes, this
$) Ross, ‘Autonomous kingdom’, ch. .
$* Cf. the argument of Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, –, –.
%! Yoder, ‘Fly and Elephant Parties ’. %" Forbes, Dahomey, ii, .
%# M. J. Herskovits, Dahomey, An Ancient West African Kingdom ( vols.) (New York,
), i, .
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interpretation is surely a reasonable one.%$ The more critical point, however,
is that there are no compelling grounds, either in Forbes’ account of the 
debates or in the more general logic of the situation, for supposing that
opposition to war with Abeokuta was evidence of support for the ending of
the slave trade. If the purpose of war was to secure captives for the slave
trade, indeed, a campaign against a weaker opponent such as Aja might well
have been regarded as more appropriate.%% Forbes’ narrative affords little
support for the idea of divisions within the Dahomian ruling e! lite over the
issue of the slave trade, as opposed to that of war with Abeokuta. When Gezo
refused to sign the anti-slave trade treaty, Forbes noted that ‘the ministers
all showed their pleasure’ ; the only visible dissentient was the Yovogan, or
Governor of Whydah, who ‘could not disguise his anxiety’ that the refusal
might lead (as indeed, in the event it did) to a commercial blockade.%&
Yoder’s argument, in fact, rests less upon explicit evidence in Forbes’
account of the  debates than upon the imputation of an inherent conflict
of interest between slavetraders and palm oil traders in Dahomey, the former
presumed to be largely Brazilian and the latter indigenous Dahomians.
Forbes noted the existence in Whydah alongside the resident Brazilian
slavetraders of a significant group of indigenous entrepreneurs, referring
specifically to ‘five native merchants, who may be termed very rich’, among
whom he named three: Adjovi, Gnahoui and Houenou (or Que!num).%' The
supposed dichotomy between Brazilian slavetraders and Dahomian oil
traders is, however, certainly untenable.
In the first place, Yoder’s suggestion that the Brazilian traders were
opposed to the establishment of trade in any other commodities than slaves
is unwarranted. The only supporting evidence cited is a report of the British
explorer John Duncan in  that Gezo had prohibited the manufacture of
shea-butter except in small quantities for domestic consumption, allegedly at
the instigation of ‘the Spanish and Portuguese slave-dealers ’ at Whydah,
who feared that the development of an export trade in shea-butter would
divert energies from the slave trade.%( This account, however, does not relate
directly to the much more important trade in palm oil, which clearly was not
suffering any similar official discouragement at this time. It seems possible,
in any case, that Duncan misunderstood the significance of the restriction of
shea-butter production, since an account of the s recording a parallel
prohibition on the cultivation for export of groundnuts reports on the
contrary that this was intended to prevent the diversion of labour required
for the harvesting of palm oil.%) Dahomian official tradition records that the
leading Brazilian merchant, the Chacha Francisco Felix de Souza, far from
opposing the palm oil trade, in fact advised Gezo of the potential commercial
value of palm oil.%* The contemporary evidence also implies that de Souza
was supportive of, rather than opposed to, the new trade in oil. When the
British palm oil trader Thomas Hutton sought permission to open a factory
%$ Ross, ‘Anti-slave trade theme’, –.
%% As argued by Hargreaves, ‘Ideological interpretation’, .
%& Forbes, Dahomey, ii, .
%' Ibid. i, – ; cf. Law, ‘Slave-raiders and middlemen’, –.
%( Duncan, Travels, i, –. %) Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , .
%* Le Herisse! , L’ancien royaume du Dahomey, , .
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at Whydah in , for example, he travelled to the Dahomian capital
Abomey ‘under de Souza’s protection’.&!
In any case, as earlier work had already shown, by the time of Forbes’ visit
to Dahomey in , the Brazilian traders themselves were no longer trading
exclusively in slaves.&" De Souza himself, although in  he had told a
visiting French officer that he ‘despised’ the palm oil trade as being ‘too
insignificant to support the position he had made for himself ’, had in 
begun to sell palm oil for export.&# Duncan, returned to Whydah as British
Vice-Consul in , reported that ‘the whole of the merchants who during
my last residence in this place in  and  were extensively engaged in
the Slave Trade at that period, are now very extensively engaged in the palm-
oil trade’.&$ Forbes himself noted that another of the Brazilians settled in
Whydah, Jose! Francisco dos Santos, ‘although a slave-dealer, is also a palm-
oil purchaser to a great extent’, and had ‘a plantation on which he
manufactures oil ’.&% These Brazilians had turned to the oil trade not as a
substitute for the slave trade but as a supplement and aid to it, since the oil
was sold for European manufactures which in turn were exchanged for
slaves. Domingo Martinez, the leading Brazilian trader in Dahomey after the
death of de Souza, told Forbes that ‘the slave and palm-oil trade helped each
other, and that in connection he did not know which was the most
profitable’.&& Contrariwise, the suggestion that the native Dahomian mer-
chants traded exclusively in palm oil is also unwarranted. Forbes in  did
report that at least one of the Dahomian traders of Whydah, Adjovi, was
engaged in the oil trade, owning ‘a very extensive palm-oil plantation’; but
he equally documents the involvement of another, Gnahoui, in the slave
trade, ‘as great a merchant as exists in Dahomey, and as great a slave-
dealer ’.&' Forbes records, indeed, that Gnahoui, who served as interpreter to
the British in the negotiations of , remarked that ‘he was working
against his own interest in explaining matters to us, saying that the Slave
Trade was sweet to him’.&(
The only source which supports Yoder’s interpretation (though not cited
by Yoder himself) derives from the traditional history of the Que!num family
of Whydah, which maintains that it was Azanmado Houenou, the head of the
family at this period, who persuaded Gezo to develop trade in palm produce,
against the advice of the Chacha de Souza, who claimed that such exports
would undermine the provisioning of the Dahomian army.&) In view of the
contradictory evidence about de Souza’s role cited above, this story can
hardly be accepted at face value. As told, it is also manifestly confused in
&! PP: RSCWCA, Minutes of Evidence, W. M. Hutton, .
&" Cf. David Ross, ‘The career of Domingo Martinez in the Bight of Benin – ’,
J. Afr. Hist.,  (),  ; Verger, Flux et reflux, –.
&# De Monleon, ‘Le Dahome! , Fernando-Po et l’Ile du Prince, en  ’, Revue
Coloniale,  (),  ; PRO: CO.}, T. Hutton, Badagry,  Dec. .
&$ PP: Correspondence Relating to the Slave Trade [hereafter CRST] –, ii, no.
 : Vice-Consul Duncan, Whydah,  Aug. . &% Forbes, Dahomey, i, .
&& Ibid. ii, . &' Ibid. i,  ; ii, .
&( PP: PRRL, incl.  in no.  : Journal of Lieutenant Forbes,  July .
&) Maximilien Que!num, Les anceW tres de la famille QueUnum (Langres, ), – ; the
anecdote had also been given earlier, in Que!num, Au pays des Fon (rd ed., Paris,  ;
first published ), .
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detail, since it associates the introduction of the palm produce trade with a
French merchant called Me!dard Be! raud, who did not arrive in Whydah until
. An earlier version of the story in fact credits Be! raud with introducing
the trade specifically in palm kernels (which developed only from the mid-
s), and – consistently with this – links him with Azanmado Houenou’s
son, Kpadonou Houenou, rather than with Azanmado himself ; it further
states that the objection to this trade came from the Yovogan, rather than
from the Chacha.&* There is no doubt that de Souza and Houenou were rivals
and that the latter rose to prominence at the former’s expense, but this
represented a personal feud between individuals rather than a conflict
between Brazilian and indigenous merchants (or between slavers and palm
oil traders) as groups; Azanmado Houenou was, in fact, closely associated in
his early commercial activities with another Brazilian slavetrader, Joaquim
d’Almeida.'!
There is more convincing evidence for the emergence of factional divisions
in Dahomey after the imposition of the treaty banning the slave trade in
, when Gezo adopted much more radical policies of reform. The British
indeed maintained that he did not in practice observe the  treaty, but
this was largely a matter of definition. Gezo himself insisted that he was
observing the treaty, but evidently interpreted his obligations under it more
narrowly than the British.'" In , for example, he insisted that he
personally was not selling any slaves and that he had also prohibited the
shipping of slaves ‘from any of the ports in his dominions’, but remained
evasive about the supply of slaves from Dahomey for shipment from
neighbouring places, declaring that ‘he cannot interfere with the internal
slave trade, that being carried on in all parts of Africa’.'#
In the present context, the critical point is that Gezo grasped that the
ending of the slave trade implied the demilitarization of Dahomey. Other
evidence shows that in this period he suspended large-scale military
campaigns: when, at the end of his reign in  Dahomian military
operations were resumed with an attack on the town of Ekpo (in the kingdom
of Ketu), the British Consul at Lagos to the east acknowledged that ‘It is
some years since the King of Dahomey has made so successful a foray, or
slave hunt’.'$ Gezo declared to a visiting French mission in , in stark
contrast to his earlier insistence on the political impossibility of renouncing
war: ‘Peace is a good thing, it allows one to devote oneself to cultivation and
trade; I only make war when I am forced to’.'%
As a substitute for the declining slave trade, Dahomey’s participation in
the export of palm oil was intensified. The French mission in , for
example, reported that the volume of palm oil exports was ‘ increasing every
year’, and that ‘the number of recently planted palm trees…is incalculable
around nearly all the villages’.'& The area devoted to palm oil cultivation was
now extended geographically into the Dahomian heartland in the interior:
&* Reynier, ‘Ouidah’, .
'! Que!num, Les anceW tres, – ; cf. also E; douard Foa' , Le Dahomey (Paris, ), .
'" Cf. Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, –.
'# PP: CRST –, incl.  in no.  : Major Ord, The Hague,  July .
'$ PP: CRST –, ii, no.  : Consul Campbell, Lagos,  Mar. .
'% Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , Revue Maritime et Coloniale,  (),
. '& Ibid. Part , .
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whereas in  (as cited earlier) Gezo had stressed the lack of farms north
of the Lama, Burton in  found the area immediately south of the capital,
Abomey, ‘scattered with valuable plantations of the oil palm’.'' Levels of
taxation on the palm oil trade were also increased. In particular, the
production as well as export of oil was now subject to taxation: whereas
Forbes in  had alluded only to a tax on sales of oil, by the s there
was also a tax on the oil harvest.'(
Gezo also now entered the production of oil for export on his own account.
Whereas Forbes in , as cited earlier, described the palm oil plantations
which then existed at Whydah as owned by either Brazilian or Dahomian
private merchants, later evidence documents the existence of royal oil
plantations also. The evidence for the s is, admittedly, somewhat
ambivalent. The French in  reported that the king had reserved to
himself ‘vast plantations’ on which slaves were employed to produce oil for
export, but noted that they were run for him by ‘king’s traders’ who paid
him a proportion of the profits.') The wording suggests that this may relate
to private Dahomian merchants in the Whydah area who held their estates
and slaves technically as grants from the king rather than to royal plantations
in a strict sense. Burton in the s, however, reported more unambiguously
that the oil plantations in the vicinity of the capital Abomey belonged to ‘the
King and his ministers ’.'*
The ideological objections to the monarch thus becoming directly involved
in commercial agriculture, which Gezo had earlier cited to the British as an
obstacle, were apparently overcome by the invention of a fictitious alternative
identity for the king, as king of ‘the bush’ or countryside, in whose name the
king’s transactions in palm oil could be conducted. The Annual Customs
were elaborated by the inclusion of additional ceremonies celebrating the
king’s new agricultural role, which are first attested in contemporary sources
in . Although it has been suggested that the institution of the ‘Bush
King’ dates from the beginning of Gezo’s reign and was therefore un-
connected with the rise of the palm oil trade, the absence of any reference to
it in Forbes’ very detailed account of the Customs in  suggests that it was
in fact an innovation of the early s.(!
The ideological dimension of Gezo’s reform programme also extended
into the centrally important (because politically sensitive) issue of human
sacrifice. In  he sent a message to the British authorities that ‘he would
give up the practice of human sacrifices altogether, according to the
recommendation of the English’.(" As with the treaty banning the slave
trade, there is room for dispute over whether Gezo in practice carried out
this promise, and indeed for uncertainty as to what precisely he meant in
'' PP: CRST , ii, no.  : Consul Burton, Bonny River,  Mar. .
'( Forbes, Dahomey, i,  ; Abbe! Laffitte, Le DahomeU (Tours, ), . Dahomian
tradition confirms that the tax on the oil harvest was introduced in the s (after the war
with Abeokuta in ) : Le Herisse! , L’ancien royaume du Dahomey, .
') Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part ,  ; also Repin, ‘Voyage au Dahomey’,
Le Tour du Monde,  (), .
'* Burton, Mission, i,  ; cf. Law, ‘Royal monopoly’, .
(! Edna G. Bay, ‘On the trail of the Bush King: a Dahomean lesson in the use of
evidence’, History in Africa,  (), –.
(" PP: CRST –, i. no.  : Rear-Admiral Bruce, Ascension,  Apr. .
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making it. Sacrifices at the Annual Customs certainly continued, but on a
substantially reduced scale: the British Consul at Lagos in 
acknowledged that the number of sacrifices ‘ in the last years have been
reduced from hundreds to tens’ ; and in  that the numbers sacrificed ‘of
late years had diminished to some thirty or forty’.(# Accounts recorded by
French missionaries in Dahomey a few years after Gezo’s death claim further
that in this period he sacrificed ‘virtually only’ convicted criminals, implying
that the killing of war captives had been discontinued.($ It seems probable in
fact that it was specifically the ending of the sacrifice of war captives which
Gezo intended to promise in  ; as was suggested earlier, this restriction
symbolized the renunciation of Dahomey’s traditional militarism.
From , however, Gezo’s policies were reversed, with a revival of slave
exports from Whydah. In early , a British naval officer reported that
Gezo was giving ‘every encouragement to the Slave-dealers ’, and expressing
‘the greatest hostility’ towards the British.(% Later in , the reversal of
Gezo’s policies was more decisively and dramatically marked by the
resumption of military aggression, in the attack on Ekpo noted earlier. The
British Consul at Lagos, reporting this campaign, anticipated that it would
result in an increase in the numbers of human sacrifices, as well as of slave
exports.
This reversal of policy was clearly due in part to the recovery of demand
for slaves at this time (with exports now going mainly to Cuba). But it also
reflected political changes within Dahomey itself, with the emergence of
overt opposition to Gezo among the senior chiefs. Members of the French
mission which visited Dahomey in  thus allude to the existence of a
faction opposed to Gezo’s reforms: ‘the old party discontented with the
European tendencies of Gezo’, or ‘the party of resistance…what would be
called elsewhere, in Turkey for example, the old national party’.(& Burton,
retrospectively, spoke of ‘the reactionary party’.(' The leader of this
‘national ’ party is said to have been the Mehu, the second-ranking chief after
the king;(( one account also links the Yovogan, or Governor of Whydah, with
him.() The later French missionary accounts, however, speak of the
opposition to Gezo as led by the ‘fetisheers ’ or priests of the Dahomian
religious cults.(* Precisely which aspects of Gezo’s policies the Mehu and his
allies objected to is not made clear in the contemporary accounts of  ; but
the later missionary accounts imply that they were opposed above all to his
reduction of human sacrifice.
(# PP: CRST –, ii, no.  : Consul Campbell, Lagos,  Apr.  ; –, ii, no.
 : Consul Campbell, Lagos,  Nov. . Gezo’s reduction in the scale of sacrifices at the
Customs had, however, begun even before his declaration of  : cf. e.g. Forbes,
Dahomey, i, .
($ Laffitte, Le DahomeU ,  ; Abbe! Borghero, Whydah,  Sept. , in ‘Missions du
Dahomey’, Annales de la Propagation de la Foi,  (), –.
(% PP: CRST –, i, no.  : Rear-Admiral Sir F. Grey, Sierra Leone,  Feb.
.
(& Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part ,  ; Repin, ‘Voyage au Dahomey’, .
(' Burton, Mission, ii, ,  – but Burton may here be merely echoing the published
account of Vallon rather than providing independent corroboration.
(( Repin, ‘Voyage au Dahomey’, .
() Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , .
(* Borghero, in ‘Missions du Dahomey’, – ; Laffitte, Le DahomeU , .
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The position of the heir apparent Badahun within Dahomian politics also
underwent an evolution. Badahun was not Gezo’s eldest son, but was
preferred to an elder brother called Godo because of the latter’s drunk-
enness.)! According to Burton, Badahun was aged thirty-eight at his
accession in , which suggests that he was born c. .)" Dahomian
tradition asserts that he was adopted as Gezo’s heir  years after the latter’s
accession, i.e. in c. , when he would have been aged around twenty-
seven.)# He had certainly been designated by , when Forbes recorded his
name (as ‘Bah-dah-hoong’) and noted his official residence as heir apparent
at Jegbe, outside Abomey.)$ It does not appear, however, that he yet
exercised any real influence over Dahomian policy: an account of  noted
explicitly that, although entrusted by his father with command of a
contingent of the army, ‘he is not at all concerned in political matters, and
was never called to any council ’.)% Although he did in fact take part in the
debates of  witnessed by Forbes, his only recorded contribution was an
emphatic support of his father: ‘So long as I live, I shall call upon the fetish
to cause my father’s life to be happy and continued’.)&
Subsequently, however, the situation changed. In  the British
missionary Joseph Dawson, visiting the Dahomian court, noted that he had
to approach Gezo ‘through’ the heir apparent.)' The French in  likewise
noted Badahun’s enhanced influence, reporting that ‘his voice carries great
weight in the council ’.)( More critically, his influence was exercised in
support of the conservative opposition, against his father’s reforming
policies. In , Badahun dealt with Dawson to urge him to encourage the
establishment of a British factory at Whydah, which implies that he still
supported his father’s policy of promoting the oil trade. The French in ,
however, described him as a member of the ‘national ’ party opposed to the
king: ‘much less desirous than [Gezo] to see civilisation and the customs of
the whites penetrate his realms’, and ‘much more attached, as a matter of
considered policy, to the old customs of the country’.)) Badahun’s official
residence at Jegbe seems to have become a sort of rival court, where he held
aloof, ‘contenting himself with the company of the old party’ opposed to
Gezo’s policies.)*
Ultimately the reactionary opposition attained such strength that it was
able effectively to take over the government of Dahomey. Already in ,
the French reported that the Mehu ‘enjoys great influence over Gezo’.*! The
)! Burton, Mission, i, , n. ; ii, .
)" Ibid. ii, . The French in , however, thought Badahun was then aged forty to
forty-five, making him four to nine years older: Repin, ‘Voyage au Dahomey’,  ;
Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , . )# Djivo, GueUzo, .
)$ Forbes, Dahomey, i, .
)% Auguste Bouet, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, L’Illustration,  (), , n. .
)& Forbes, Dahomey, ii, .
)' PP: CRST –, ii, incl.  in no.  : Joseph Dawson, Whydah,  Aug. .
)( Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , .
)) Repin, ‘Voyage au Dahomey’,  ; Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , .
)* Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , . Burton’s later references to
Badahun having ‘retired from the court, disliking French innovations’, and staying at
Jegbe ‘cultivating the reactionary party’, are, here again, probably derived from Vallon
rather than independent corroboration: CRST, , ii, no.  : Consul Burton, Bonny
River,  Mar.  ; Burton, Mission, ii, . *! Repin, ‘Voyage au Dahomey’, .
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Mehu’s influence was such, in fact, that the French erroneously regarded
him, rather than the nominally higher-ranking Migan, as the senior chief, or
‘prime minister’.*" One member of the  mission who returned to
Dahomey in  observed further that in the interval Gezo’s advancing age
had transformed the Dahomian polity from an absolute monarchy into ‘a real
oligarchy’; Gezo is described as ‘contenting himself with reigning’ and
‘most often, absolutely uninvolved in the business done in his name’, and
only approachable through his officials, especially the Mehu.*# Another
French officer in  described Gezo as ‘only the shadow of his son and his
Minister [referring evidently to the Mehu]’.*$ A later account indeed even
claims that Gezo had ‘voluntarily abdicated’ in favour of Badahun shortly
before his death.*%
The implication is that the revival of militarism, the slave trade and human
sacrifice symbolized by the attack on Ekpo in  represented the capture
of the government by the conservative faction rather than a change of mind
on Gezo’s part. Disagreement over the Ekpo campaign (as well as over
human sacrifice) is in fact explicitly acknowledged in the French missionary
accounts, which report that Gezo had refused to sacrifice the prisoners taken
in it, distributing them instead as gifts.*& Corroboration that Gezo opposed
the war against Ekpo is provided by Dahomian tradition, which recalls that
Gezo himself was reluctant to attack it, but was overborne by the insistence
of his war chiefs.*' Gezo’s reluctance to attack Ekpo is said to have been due
to a prophecy that, if he did, he would die; and this is at least not an ex post
facto invention, since already in  Forbes heard of a prophecy that if
Dahomey attacked Ketu (to which Ekpo belonged) the king would die.*( The
attack on Ekpo was, indeed, very shortly followed by Gezo’s death and
Glele’s accession to the throne.
’ , 
The French missionary accounts of the s claim that Gezo was murdered,
poisoned by the priests opposed to his reduction of human sacrifice.*) This
seems doubtful, Burton more credibly reporting that he died of smallpox.**
Since, however, smallpox was believed to be caused by the god Sakpata,
Gezo’s death may well have been attributed to divine retribution."!!
As noted earlier, despite Badahun’s status as the designated heir apparent,
his succession was disputed. The rival claim to the throne came not from his
discredited elder brother Godo but, according to Burton, from ‘other
*" Ibid.  ; Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , .
*# Vallon, ‘Le royaume de Dahomey’, Part , –, .
*$ Protet,  May , quoted by Ross, ‘Autonomous kingdom’, .
*% Foa' , Le Dahomey, .
*& Borghero, in ‘Missions du Dahomey’, , referring to Gezo’s ‘ last war’.
*' Thomas Moule! ro, ‘Guezo ou Guedizo Massigbe’, Eo tudes DahomeU ennes, (NS) 
(), . *( Forbes, Dahomey, i, .
*) Laffite, Le DahomeU ,  ; cf. Borghero, in ‘Missions du Dahomey’, .
** Burton, Mission, ii, .
"!! Some later sources claim that Gezo died of a wound suffered in the campaign
against Ekpo: e.g. Hazoume! , Le pacte de sang, –. This story is probably also
spurious, having perhaps arisen as embroidery of the assertion that Gezo was ‘killed’
(magically) by the Ekpo war.
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brothers’."!" More recently recorded tradition names a brother called
‘Ouinsou [Huensu?] ’ as having claimed the throne, with the support of the
Yavedo, a senior female official of the royal palace."!# Beyond the individual
claims of rival princes, however, the challenge to Badahun involved the
progressive elements who had earlier supported Gezo’s reforms. According
to the French missionary accounts, the disagreement among the chiefs over
the succession reflected a division on the issue of human sacrifice: ‘one side
wanted the maintenance of the old customs which demanded the immolation
of thousands of victims every year; the others wanted their abolition’.
Badahun’s succession thus represented the triumph of the conservative
faction."!$
The perception of Badahun (or Glele, as he should now be called) as
standing for the reversal of Gezo’s policies was not peculiar to the
missionaries, but shared by other Europeans. A French trader in , for
example, reported that Glele ‘gives the impression of inaugurating a policy
very unfavourable to the Europeans who live at Whydah…Gezo, by
contrast, had much preference for the whites’."!% Gezo’s repudiation of his
father’s policies, it should be stressed, was far from total, since some of
Gezo’s key innovations, including the royal palm oil plantations, direct
taxation of the oil harvest and the institution of the ‘Bush King’, were
retained under Glele. What Glele’s reversal of Gezo’s policies meant in
practice was a reassertion of Dahomey’s traditional militarism, the new king
proceeding to launch a series of aggressive campaigns against neighbouring
countries. As the French trader Be! raud observed in , ‘Less peaceful
than Guezo…Grere [Glele] dreams only of martial adventures’."!&
This reassertion of Dahomian militarism was linked to the revival not only
of the export trade in slaves but also of human sacrifice. The French
missionaries claimed that Glele’s accession was followed by a massive
increase in the scale of human sacrifice."!' On this, however, some caution is
in order, since perceptions were clouded by the celebration of the actual
funeral ceremonies (or ‘Grand Customs’) for Gezo in the years immediately
following his death; although these certainly involved a much larger scale of
human sacrifice than the regular Annual Customs, this did not in itself
necessarily imply an increase over previous levels in the longer term. Even
after the ‘Grand Customs’ were concluded, however, there are indications
that Glele did practise sacrifice on a larger scale than Gezo in his last years."!(
The British naval officer Wilmot, on a mission to Dahomey in , for
example, observed that in the ceremony of the ‘Platform Custom’ (one of the
most important public episodes of the Annual Customs, in which human
victims were killed and thrown down from a platform), Glele had four
"!" Burton, Mission, ii, .
"!# E; douard Dunglas, ‘Contribution a' l’histoire du Moyen-Dahomey’, Part , Eo tudes
DahomeU ennes,  (), .
"!$ Borghero, in ‘Missions du Dahomey’,  ; cf. Laffite, Le DahomeU , .
"!% Lartigue,  Aug. , quoted by Thomas C. Maroukis, ‘Warfare and society in the
history of Dahomey, – ’ (Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, ), .
"!& M. Be! raud, ‘Note sur le Dahome! ’, Bulletin de la SocieU teU de la GeUographie,  (),
. "!' Borghero, in ‘Missions du Dahomey’, –.
"!( Cf. Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, –.
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platforms, whereas his predecessor Gezo had never had more than two, and
explained that ‘he is determined to excel him in everything, and to do as
much again as he did’."!) Burton in  recorded the total number of those
pubicly sacrificed at the Customs as , which he regarded as a modest
increase over the  deaths witnessed by Forbes in ."!* Burton also,
echoing the French missionaries cited earlier, acknowledged that the cir-
cumstances of Glele’s succession had made it politically impossible for him
to accept the demand for the abolition of human sacrifices which Burton had
to transmit: ‘ the present King is for the present committed to them; he rose
to power by the goodwill of the reactionary party, and upon it he depends’.""!
Glele’s reassertion of Dahomian militarism and his elaboration of the
ceremonial cycle associated with it also had the effect of undermining the
palm oil trade by withdrawing labour from the agricultural sector.""" In
, for example, the British Consul at Lagos complained that in Dahomey
‘agriculture is at a standstill, and legitimate trade next to nothing; the
population of the villages is most scanty, and liable to be called out at any
moment to go on some slave-hunting expedition’.""# Likewise Be! raud in
 : ‘ the present king, by his wars and continual ceremonies, is annoying
the people, who are thus obliged to spend a large part of the year at the
capital, ruining trade by making the exploitation of the palms almost
impossible’.""$
It should be noted that, in contradiction to the interpretation adopted here
of a reversal of Gezo’s reforming policies by Glele, the latter on several
occasions insisted on the essential continuity between his and his father’s
policies. On his accession in , indeed, Glele ‘publicly proclaimed’ not
the repudiation of his father’s policies but ‘his intention to follow in the steps
of his father, and to continue slave-hunts and the Slave-Trade’.""% Likewise,
Glele told the British missionary Peter Bernasko in  : ‘War, bloodshed
[i.e. human sacrifice] and slave selling had been left to him by his father, he
could not avoid them’. And in , in response to the demand that he end
human sacrifices : ‘Had my father put aside all the Customs before he died
I could never resume them’.""& This, however, should be understood as
alluding to the fact that, as has been seen, Gezo had indeed been obliged to
abandon his anti-miliarist policies under pressure from Badahun and the
conservative faction; although not strictly inaccurate, the assertion of
continuity with Gezo’s policies was disingenuous.
"!) PP: Despatches from Commodore Wilmot, . Forbes’ account of the  Customs
mentions only a single platform; the increase to two was related to the institution of the
‘Bush King’, separate ceremonies being conducted for the king and his fictive double (cf.
Burton, Mission, ii, ), and had therefore presumably occurred during the later years
of Gezo.
"!* Burton, Mission, ii,  (misremembering Forbes’ total as ) ; cf. Forbes, Dahomey,
ii, . The figures for  and  are not strictly comparable, since Forbes’ total
included  sacrifices made at the royal graves after the main ceremonies, whereas Burton’s
did not: the real increase was therefore from  in  to  in .
""! Burton, Mission, ii,  ; cf. also ii, . """ Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, –.
""# PP: CRST , ii, no.  : Consul Freeman, Lagos,  July .
""$ Be! raud, ‘Note sur le Dahome! ’, –.
""% PP: CRST –, ii, no.  : Consul Campbell, Lagos,  Feb. .
""& Bernasko, Oct.  and  Oct. , quoted in Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, –.
  
, –
The accession of Glele in  did not resolve the disputes which Gezo’s
reforming policies had occasioned. Those who had supported Gezo’s policies
now formed a dissident group within Dahomey. Widespread hostility to
Glele’s revival of militarism was noted, for example, by Wilmot in  :
People have no time for peaceful pursuits : war, war, war is alone thought of, and
the King gives them no rest. Many of the Chiefs complain of this, and seem
heartily tired of it. I am sure they would gladly turn to a better state of things if
they dared.""'
Opposition to Glele was especially strong in the coastal town of Whydah,
which was most committed to the trade in palm oil. In , for example, the
British Consul at Lagos reported that:
It appears, from all I hear, that the present King of Dahomey is much disliked at
Whydah, his government being more intolerable than that of his father…I hear
that at the present moment it would require but little to cause a revolt against the
authority of Guelele.""(
Likewise Burton in  : ‘The people of Whydah are worn out with wars
and customs, and many of them are flying with their wives and families to the
adjoining provinces’."") Burton refers specifically to forty families who had
recently fled from Whydah to Porto-Novo to the east, lately brought under
French protection, ‘as a land of liberty’.""*
Tension between the newly installed Glele and the merchant community
of Whydah is also reflected in the liquidation of one of its leading figures, the
Chacha. The eldest son and successor of Francisco Felix de Souza, Isidoro,
having died in , shortly before Gezo himself, this office was now held by
another son of the original Chacha, Ignacio de Souza; but in about  he
was arrested on suspicion of supplying information to the British anti-slaving
naval patrol and ‘disappeared’, and property at Whydah was ‘broken’."#!
Although another brother succeeded him in the office of Chacha, he did not
exercise the earlier power of the office: in , it was reported that the office
of Chacha was ‘ little more than a name’"#". Around this time, indeed, Glele
promoted Azanmado Houenou, an old enemy and rival of the de Souza
family, to the new position of ahisigan, i.e. ‘chief of traders’ at Whydah,
effectively superseding the Chacha."## When this man died in , his
position was inherited by his son Kpadonou Houenou."#$
Glele also reorganized the political administration at Whydah. In  it
was noted that a relative of the king had been appointed to the Whydah
""' PP: Despatches from Commodore Wilmot, .
""( PP: CRST , ii, no.  : Consul Brand, Lagos,  Apr. .
"") PP: CRST , ii, no.  : Consul Burton, Bonny River,  Mar. .
""* Burton, Mission to Gelele, ii, , n. "#! Ibid. i, .
"#" PP: CRST , no.  : Consul Brand, Lagos,  Apr. .
"## Reynier, ‘Ouidah’, . Burton in  describes Houenou as ‘now promoted’ to
this rank: Mission, ii, , n. However, he is already described as ‘minister of commerce’
in  : Laffitte, La DahomeU , –. Cf. also Que!num, Les anceW tres, –, which
however erroneously dates the appointment to the reign of Gezo.
"#$ Reynier, ‘Ouidah’,  ; cf. Que!num, Les anceW tres, – (where ‘ ’ on p.  is
clearly a misprint for ‘ ’).
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administration, to ‘watch over and direct the proceedings’ of the Yovogan."#%
Later accounts show that this individual’s name or title was Chodaton."#& He
was a cousin of Glele, the son of one of King Gezo’s brothers."#' The
appointment of such royal counterparts to leading officials was not wholly
new, but had been initiated by Gezo, as has been seen, early in his reign. The
absence of any reference to such a counterpart to the Yovogan in the
abundant contemporary documentation before the s, however, suggests
that its extension to the Whydah administration was an innovation. Unlike
the earlier royal counterparts appointed by Gezo, moreover, the Chodaton’s
was evidently not a purely honorific post, but involved a real sharing of
authority with the Yovogan. The seriousness of Glele’s purpose in appointing
him as a reassertion of royal power is suggested by the name Chodaton,
meaning literally ‘Everything belongs to the King’.
The evidence of Burton in  shows, moreover, that the appointment of
deputies or counterparts was not restricted to Whydah since he noted the
existence of similar ‘ lieutenants’ to the Migan and the Mehu, and also to the
senior military commanders, the Gau and the Posu: called respectively
Adandejan, Bihuento, Matro and Ahwigbamen. Like the Chodaton, these
seem all to have been originally members of the royal family: the Adandejan
is described as a cousin and the Matro and Ahwigbamen as brothers to the
King, while the Bihuento of , although not himself of royal blood, had
‘lately succeeded to the name and rank of a nephew of the king’ who had
suffered disgrace."#( Here again, these were clearly substantive rather than
purely honorary posts : Burton explained elsewhere that their purpose was to
‘neutralise ’ the officials inherited by Glele from his father without im-
mediately dismissing them, ‘by appointing as their aids younger men, of
higher rank in the empire’, in order to ‘keep the elder in check’."#)
The purpose of this policy was evidently not only to ‘neutralise ’ officials
who had opposed Glele’s succession, since it was applied also to his
supporters such as the Mehu and the Yovogan; rather, the intention was to
curtail the influence of all chiefs in order to enhance the king’s effective
independence. It served in practice to institutionalize rather than end
divisions over policy since some of those appointed ended by espousing the
reformist attitudes which Glele himself had repudiated. Already in ,
Burton was given to understand that the Chodaton was ‘a firm friend to the
English’, in contrast to the monarch’s more ambivalent attitude. In the
capital, Abomey, where Burton thought he could distinguish between
‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ chiefs (admittedly on the subjective, or at least
impressionistic, grounds of their demeanour in greeting him), he included
among the former the Bihuento and the Matro, royal deputies to the Mehu
and the Gau."#* It may be, indeed, that the structural tension between chiefs
and their deputies itself tended to push the latter into opposition, the pro-
British attitude of the Chodaton and the Bihuento being perhaps the reflex
"#% PP: CRST , ii, no.  : Consul Brand, Lagos,  Apr. .
"#& E.g. Laffitte, Le DahomeU ,  (‘Schoundaton’) ; Burton, Mission, i, 
(‘Chyudaton’). Cf. also Casimir Agbo, Histoire de Ouidah (Avignon, ), .
"#' Burton, Mission, i, , n.,  ; Gle! le, Le Danxome, .
"#( Burton, Mission, i, –. "#) Ibid. i, .
"#* Ibid. i, , n., –. The supposedly unfriendly chiefs included the Migan and the
Tokpo (the official responsible for agriculture).
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of the conservative posture of the Yovogan and the Mehu. Likewise,
although Azanmado Houenou was presumably promoted as a partisan of
Glele’s pro-slaving policy, his son and successor Kpadonou Houenou
became a supporter of ‘ legitimate’ commerce, as noted earlier, championing
the new trade in palm kernels against the opposition of the Yovogan.
The revival of the slave trade proved only temporary, with exports to Cuba
effectively ceasing by . The divisions arising from Glele’s policies,
however, persisted beyond the s, with the Whydah merchant community
in particular resentful both of the military mobilization which disrupted oil
production and of high and arbitrary levels of royal taxation of their
activities."$! It seems likely that these continuing tensions are reflected, as
Patrick Manning has suggested, in conflict over the succession to Glele
himself which developed from the s onwards."$" Glele initially appointed
one of his sons called Ahanhanzo as his heir apparent, but his claims were
contested by another son called Kondo; and when Ahanhanzo died prema-
turely (like Gezo earlier, of smallpox) it was alleged that he had been killed
by ‘black magic’ employed by Kondo."$# Kondo in turn was installed as heir
apparent in , and it was he who eventually succeeded Glele, under the
name Behanzin, in . There is some suggestion that Ahanhanzo was
associated with a policy of relative friendliness towards European influence
while Kondo stood for more uncompromising resistance. It is at least
consistent with this hypothesis that Kpadonou Houenou, the spokesperson
of commercial interests at Whydah, supported the claims of Ahanhanzo
against Kondo."$$
There is more concrete evidence for continuing tensions between Glele
and the merchant community of Whydah during the s and s. A
renewed clash was occasioned by the second British naval blockade of
Whydah in –, provoked by the mistreatment of a British trader by the
Whydah authorities. Although local Dahomian officials were initially con-
ciliatory towards the British demands for compensation, they were overruled
by Glele, who insisted upon defying the British."$% After the blockade had
been lifted, Glele summoned to Abomey several of the Whydah merchants
whose behaviour he judged disloyal, including both Brazilians and
Dahomians, and detained them there for varying periods."$& Among these
was Kpadonou Houenou, who was accused of intriguing to place Dahomey
under a British protectorate with a view to making himself king; his property
in Whydah was confiscated and he himself died still in prison in ."$' His
son, Tovalou Que!num, sought refuge in Porto-Novo."$( Although the fall of
the Houenou family in part reflected factional struggles within the Whydah
"$! E.g. Serval, ‘Rapport sur une mission au Dahomey’, Revue Maritime et Coloniale,
 (), .
"$" Patrick Manning, ‘Le Danhome! face aux contradictions e! conomiques de l’e' re
impe! rialiste, – ’ (Paper presented at the International Conference on the Life
and Work of King Glele, Abomey, Dec. ).
"$# Bernard Maupoil, La geUomancie a[ l’ancienne CoW te des Esclaves (Institut d’Ethnologie,
Paris, ), , n. "$$ Que!num, Les anceW tres, –.
"$% Reid, ‘Warrior aristocrats ’, –.
"$& Serval, ‘Rapport ’,  ; Foa' , Le Dahomey, .
"$' Reynier, ‘Ouidah’,  ; cf. Que!num, Les anceW tres, –.
"$( Que!num, Les anceW tres, .
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merchant community, and in particular the intrigues of their old rivals, the
de Souzas, it was also symptomatic of the growing tensions between the
merchants generally and the Dahomian state."$)
When war broke out with France in , the loyalty of Whydah was again
regarded as suspect, and over , people considered sympathetic to the
French were arrested and carried into imprisonment in the interior, to be
released only by the French conquest two years later."$* One of those
arrested, who died in prison, was Atinzala Houenou, brother of Kpadonou,
and now head of the Houenou family at Whydah; Tovalou Que!num at
Porto-Novo meanwhile allied with the French against Dahomey."%! The
internal divisions arising from the mid-nineteenth century crisis of the
Dahomian monarchy had thus contributed to undermining its solidarity in
the face of European imperialism.

This article examines the background and significance of the disputed royal
succession in Dahomey following the death of King Gezo in , when the
accession of the designated heir apparent Badahun (Glele) was contested. This
dispute reflected divisions over the practice of human sacrifice, which Gezo was
seeking to curtail ; Badahun was associated with a conservative opposition to
Gezo’s reforms and his accession marked the repudiation of his father’s policies.
It is argued that the controversies over human sacrifice related to disagreements
within the Dahomian ruling e! lite about how to respond to the decline of the
Atlantic slave trade. Gezo in the s was seeking to promote the export of palm
oil as a substitute for slaves. This policy implied the demilitarization of the
Dahomian state and this in turn implied an attack on human sacrifice, which in
Dahomey was bound up with the culture of militarism. The case thus illustrates
the ideological dimension of the ‘crisis of adaptation’ posed for West African
rulers by the transition from the slave trade to commercial agriculture. The
divisions arising from this crisis persisted beyond Glele’s accession, into the late
nineteenth century, when they undermined the solidarity of the Dahomian e! lite in
the face of European imperialism.
"$) Ironically, indeed, the de Souzas in turn were to suffer disgrace, liquidation of their
leader, and confiscation a few years later () : Foa' , Le Dahomey, –.
"$* Agbo, Histoire de Ouidah, – : Agbo himself, as a child, was one of those
imprisoned on this occasion.
"%! Reynier, ‘Ouidah’,  ; Que!num, Les anceW tres, , –.
